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The U.S.  dairy  industry currently  is  experiencing  major structural  changes.  Milk
production  has  shifted  from the more  traditional  regions of the Upper  Midwest  and the
Northeast  to  the  South,  Southwest  and  Northwest.  Dairy  farm  numbers  have  declined
steadily, while the size of individual  dairy herds have increased substantially.  Productivity
of these dairy herds has been steadily  increasing.  Milk processors and marketers, both dairy
cooperatives  and investor-owned firms are declining  in number, but are becoming larger in
size and geographic  scope of operation.
It is hard to ascertain whether  historic  structural changes  are  in response to  major
changes in U.S. dairy policy,  or simply the result of changing economic conditions and new
technology at the farm, processing and marketing levels.  We believe that policy shifts have
at times been major  factors in influencing changes in the U.S. dairy  sector, but that more
often the flow of causality  is the reverse.  That is, changing economic conditions,  industry
structure,  technology, and productivity have tended to dictate policy decisions.  U.S.  dairy
policy has become increasingly market oriented since  1981 and  as a result,  farm level milk
prices  and  dairy  product  prices  have  been  determined  by  market  forces  and  not  by
government  programs during the past eight years.
In this paper we discuss the changes  in U.S. dairy policy, related farm programs, the
structural  changes  that  are  occurring  in  the  dairy  industry  and  implications  for  U.S.
competitiveness  in international dairy trade.
U.S.  DAIRY PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM
The Agricultural Act of 1949  established the dairy price support program.  USDA,
through the Commodity Credit Corporation  (CCC), supports the price dairy  farmers receive
for milk by offering to purchase unlimited quantities of butter,  nonfat dry milk, and cheddarProceedings
cheese  at  announced  prices.  These  purchase  prices  are  set  at  levels  that  enable
manufacturing  plants  to  pay  dairy  producers,  on  the  average,  the  support  price  for
manufacturing  grade milk.
1950-1972
The level of support for manufacturing  grade milk was based upon a parity formula
from  1950 to 1981.  Parity attempted to keep the same relationship between farm level prices
and farm costs as existed in the period  1910-14.  The  1949 Act required a support price for
manufacturing  grade  milk between  75  and  90 percent  of parity  taking into consideration
supply and demand conditions.  The stated goal was to maintain  an adequate  future supply
of milk.  During this period, the support price was never set at the maximum, and most often
was set at the minimum.
From  1950 to  1972, with relatively  low inflation, the support price did not change
much from year to year.  The support price increased from $3.14 per hundredweight in 1951,
average milk fat test, to $4.93 per in 1972 (Table  1).  For most of this period surpluses were
more seasonal than annual.  The program served a useful function of  providing price stability
by propping up prices in the spring. CCC stocks were sold back into the commercial market
during seasons of tighter milk supplies.  Exceptions were  1953-54  and  1961-65  when CCC
net purchases  of surplus dairy  products totalled  8 to  11  billion pounds of milk  (milk fat
equivalent).  Farm level milk prices were stable. Neither dairy producers nor manufacturing
milk plants faced much price or market risk.
During this period the support price kept dairy product prices above  world market
levels.  Commercial  dairy  exports  were minimal.  Most  exports  were  under government
assistance.  Total dairy  exports  on  a  milk  fat equivalent  basis ranged  from  350 million
pounds to 600 million pounds, most years, less than  .5  percent of production (Table 2).  In
a few years, international food assistance programs expanded  exports to levels of 1 billion
to 2.5  billion  pounds.  Dairy  imports  were  kept  in  check through  quotas  on  most dairy
products with the exception of casein and lactose.  Section  22 of the  1933 Agricultural Act
required the Secretary of Agriculture to impose import quotas if such imports undermine the
support programs.  Dairy imports ranged from 400 million to  1.4 billion pounds.
During  this  22  year  period,  the  number  of U.S.  dairy  farms  having  milk  cows
decreased from 3,648,253 to an estimated  475,000 in  1972 (Table 3).  The number of milk
cows on these farms decreased by 51 percent, 23.85 million head to 11.70 million head.  But
average  milk production  per cow  almost  doubled,  going  from  5,314  pounds  to  10,250
pounds,  for  an  annual  average  rate  of increase  of more  than  4  percent'.  Total  milk
production increased just 2.8 percent,  116.6 billion pounds to  119.9 billion pounds.
'Throughout the paper, changes  in production per cow are used as a proxy for productivity gains.
Better measures  of productivity growth might include  production per unit of feed input, production per
worker,  or production per dollar of investment. Data  are unavailable  for such measures.  However, the
authors believe  that such indexes  have moved in  close correlation with production per cow.
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Source:  USDA, ASCS reports
Table 2.  U.S.  Dairy Exports and Imports, 1950-95







































Table 3.  U.S. Dairy Farms, Number of Milk Cows,  Average Herd Size, Average Pounds
of Milk Per Cow,  Total Milk Production
Average
No.  Cows  Average  Milk Per  Total Milk,
Year  Dairy Farms  (Million Head)  Herd Size  Cow, Lbs.  Bil.Lbs.
1950  3,648,250  23.85  7  5,314  116.6
1972  475,000  11.70  25  10,250  119.9
1973  420,000  11.41  27  10,114  115.4
1981  280,000  10.90  39  12,183  132.8
1982  278,000  11.01  40  12,306  135.5
1983  n/a  11.06  n/a  12,622  139.6
1984  n/a  10.79  n/a  12,541  135.4
1985  n/a  10.98  n/a  13,024  143.0
1987  202,000  10.33  51  13,819  142.7
1995  148,690  9.50  64  16,451  155.6
Source:  USDA, ERS sources with author's estimates  for some farm numbers.
1973-1981
Beginning in  1973,  higher inflation  rates increased  parity milk prices  and thus the
support level fairly rapidly.  In just eight years  the support price more  than doubled.  The
Agriculture  and  Consumer Protection  Act of 1973 removed parity  from the price support
formula for feed grains and wheat, but the strong dairy lobby managed to retain the parity
concept  for milk.  The mid-1970s  were  favourable  years  for American  farmers.  Export
demand propelled prices for wheat, feed grains, rice,  and cotton to record  highs.  But greater
dependence  on  export markets  made  commodity prices  subject to violent  swings  due  to
economic  and political events in other parts of the world.  In  1975,  President Ford instituted
a  brief grain  embargo  against the  Soviet Union  and Poland.  By  1976  grain  prices were
declining because of substantially higher grain production and  falling exports.  Corn prices
fell  from $3.02  a bushel  in 1974  to $2.02 a bushel in  1977.  Wheat prices fell from $4.09 a
bushel to $2.33.
In response  to the price-cost  squeeze  caused by  the mid-1970s  export  surge, milk
producers  lobbied  for higher price  supports,  and  were  successful  in winning  a campaign
pledge  from  Jimmy  Carter  in  1976  to  raise  them.  Congress  subsequently  passed,  and
President Carter signed  a measure raising the minimum  support price level from 75  to 80
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percent of parity,  and requiring  semi-annual  rather than annual  adjustments.  Thus, milk
prices rose rapidly, even as feed prices declined.  The program had been transformed from
a price stability program to an income enhancement program, a goal for which the program
was ill-suited.
Dairy  farm  structure  changed  considerably  during this  period.  Expanding  grain
markets and good grain prices in the early to mid  1970s provided alternatives to dairying.
The number of farms reporting milk cows declined  by a third, from an estimated 420,000
farms to 280,000 farms.  The Corn Belt, in particular, lost many dairies.  Then, cheaper  grain
but  higher  milk prices from  the mid to late  1970s  attracted  unneeded  and less  efficient
resources  into dairying and  spurred milk  production.  Dairy  farmers were  able to obtain
credit to modernize  facilities, construct new silos etc.  Capital investment per cow increased
dramatically.  Milk surpluses developed on  a scale unseen during the first 30 years of the
dairy price support program.
Number of milk cows  during this  8 year  period  declined just  4.3  percent,  11.41
million head to  10.90  million head and  the average  milk per cow increased  from  10,114
pounds to  12,183 pounds or 20 percent.  This was an average annual productivity increase
of 2.5 percent.  This productivity and the relative  stable number of milk cows pushed total
milk production up  15 percent  from  115.4 billion pounds to  132.8 billion pounds.  CCC
purchases of surplus dairy products grew from just 1.1  billion pounds of milk equivalent in
1978-79,  to  8.2  billion pounds  in  1979-80  and  12.7  billion  pounds  for  1980-81.  Net
government expenditures for the dairy price support program increased from $250.6 million
in  1978-79 to $1.975  billion in  1980-81.
With the price  of dairy products  support well  above world  prices, CCC surpluses
could only be moved internationally with government subsidies.  Exports were at relatively
low  levels  most  years,  between  380  and  650  million  pounds  of milk  equivalent.  An
exception  was  1981  when increased  international  food  assistance  pushed exports  to 3.1
billion pounds.  In 1977, the United States exported surplus stocks of butter to New Zealand,
but refused to export to the Soviet Union or any other communist party.  New Zealand, in
turn, moved butter  into the Soviet Union.  In order to get rid of burdensome and growing
stocks of surplus dairy products, the government increased domestic distribution programs.
Dairy imports were kept at between  1.7 billion and 2.3 billion pounds of milk equivalent.
1982-1995
Milk production continued to outstrip commercial  sales, and dairy surpluses continued
to grow.  CCC purchases of  surplus dairy products reached  14.5 billion pounds in 1982,  10.9
percent of milk marketings, and a cost of about $2.4 billion.  In response, Congress finally
removed the support level from parity under the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981.  Instead,
the  level of the support  price was determined by Congress  based upon the level  of milk
surpluses and associated government costs.  The following year, Congress imposed producer
assessments  of $0.50 per hundredweight,  first collected  in April  1983,  and an additional
$0.50  implemented  on September  1, 1983 that was refundable to producers who reduced
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marketings  by  a  specified  amount.  The  support  price  was  frozen  at  $13.10  per
hundredweight.  Surpluses continued to expand  in  1983, reaching almost  17 billion pounds
of milk equivalent,  11 percent of milk marketings  at a cost of $2.6 billion.  On December 1,
1983, the support price was reduced to $12.60.  Triggers based on expected CCC purchases
further reduced  the support to $11.60  by July  1985.
In  1983,  Congress  authorized  a  national  program  for  dairy  product  promotion,
research,  and nutrition  education  as  a part  of a comprehensive  strategy  to reduce  milk
surpluses by increasing consumption.  The program was funded by a mandatory  15-cent per
hundredweight assessment on all milk marketed.  The funds are administered by a producer
board appointed  by the Secretary of Agriculture.
For the first time in U.S. history, a voluntary supply management program, "The Milk
Diversion Program" (MDP) was implemented for  15 months from January  1,1984, to March
31,  1985.  The  MDP  paid  dairy  farmers  $10.00  per  hundredweight  if they  voluntarily
contracted to reduce their milk marketing below base marketing.  The program was financed
by a $.50 per hundredweight assessment against all milk marketed.  The  15 month program
did reduce milk production, which fell from  139.6 billion pounds in  1983 to 135.4 billion in
1984.  But once the program ended, milk production  once again expanded, reaching  143.0
billion  pounds  in  1985.  The  program  also  created  regional  disputes.  The  largest
participation occurred in the Southeast where a relatively larger portion of milk production
costs are explicit variable costs, purchased feed and hired labor.  As a result, the Southeast
experienced major fluid milk deficits  in the summer and early fall of 1984 and 1985.
The Food Security Act of 1985 authorized  a voluntary dairy termination program.
Producers  submitted bids to cease milk production for at least 5 years by slaughter or export
of all dairy cattle.  Almost 14,000 bids were accepted, amounting to  12.3 million pounds of
milk,  equivalent to  8.7 percent  of total  marketings.  Again, participation  was  greater in
regions where  a larger portion of milk production  costs  are variable  costs, the South  and
Southeast.  The Act also further reduced the support price for milk and retained  producer
assessments.  The support price was reduced  from  $13.10 per hundredweight  in  1982  to
$10.60 by January  1,1988.
A major drought occurred in 1988.  The combination of voluntary supply management
programs,  reduced  price  support  levels,  producer  assessments,  and  the  drought,  at last
alleviated the burdensome milk surplus problem.  CCC purchases dropped to about 9 billion
pounds for  1989, most all of  which was butter.  Net government costs dropped to about $700
million.  The support price ratcheted  down to $10.10 on January  1,1990, where it remained
through  1995.
Under  the  Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and  Trade  Act  of  1990,  annual
adjustments to the support price  through  1995 were based on CCC purchases measured  on
a milk equivalent,  total solids basis instead of a milkfat basis.  However, the support price
could not  be less than  $10.10.  CCC financed purchases were  limited to  7 billion pounds.
Purchases above this amount were to be financed through additional producer assessments.
If purchases  were  estimated  to be less than  3.5  billion pounds  of milk, the  Secretary of
Agriculture was required to increase the support price at least $.25 cents per hundredweight.
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Since  CCC purchases  were  between  3.5  billion pounds  and  7  billion  pounds  each  year
between  1990 and  1995, the support price remained at $10.10  and no additional assessments
were imposed.
The Agricultural Reconciliation Act of 1990 implemented deficit reduction  producer
assessments.  For  1991,  the  assessment  on  all  milk  marketings  was  5  cents  per
hundredweight.  For calendar years  1992-95, they increased to  11.25 cents.  Refunds were
made  to producers  not increasing  marketings  from the previous  year.  Assessments were
increased each May  1 to cover refunds.  Few producers seem to have intentionally restricted
milk production to qualify  for refunds.  Indeed, the present assessments were  not intended
to be a supply management tool.
During the  1990s,  dairy imports held between 2.3 and 2.9 billion pounds.  Even at a
support level of$10.10US, product prices remained above world prices.  Exports were less
than  2  billion pounds  of milk  equivalent.  In  1991,  the Dairy Export  Incentive Program
(DEIP), which had been authorized, but little used, was activated  as a tool to expand exports.
DEIP sales are made by private firms, but most are foreign owned exporting firms.  Upon
contacting a potential buyer, the prospective exporter submited a bid to USDA requesting a
cash DEIP bonus that would allow the sale to take place.  DEIP bonuses were $10 million
in (fiscal)  1991,  grew to $143  million in (fiscal)  1993  and near $150 million  in (fiscal)  1995.
Exports exceeded  8.5 billion pounds milk equivalent each year since  1992.  Although DEIP
will need to be phased  down under GATT provisions,  it is authorized  through December
31,2000.  DEIP has been credited with enhancing farm  level milk prices, at times, as much
as $.50 per hundredweight  during  1991 to  1995.
Because  surpluses have been mostly  butter, USDA  lowered the purchase price  of
butter from $1.0925  per pound January  1,1990  to $.65 per pound on July 7,  1993  where  it
remains.  Conversely,  the purchase  price of  NFDM has gone  from $.79 to $1.034 per pound.
World  butter prices  strengthened  in late  1994  and  all  of 1995,  surpassing U.S.  domestic
butter prices.  For the  first time butter was exported without subsidies.  On the other hand,
the higher purchase price for NFDM has made it less competitive internationally.  However,
even with the increased support price for NFDM, prices were fairly close to world prices  in
1995.
The $10.10 support price in effect since  1990, has made U.S. dairy policy very market
oriented.  The  price  of manufacturing  milk  has  been  above  support  since  1989.  The
government program no longer determines  farm level milk prices.  As a result, milk prices
have become uncertain and highly volatile.  Price risk and  financial risk have now become
a reality for U.S.  dairy farmers, processors  and marketers.
During  the  1982-1995  period,  the  number of farms  with dairy  cows  declined  47
percent,  to  148,690.  Lower and  more  volatile  prices  placed financial  stress  on the  less
efficient dairy producers,  especially those with high debt loads.  Smaller "family" dairy farms
have felt the most pressure  from declining real milk prices.  Producers who did not adjust to
reduced  costs  experienced  lower  net  returns  and  many  exited  the  dairy  industry  either
voluntarily  or un-voluntarily.  Costs of production  have been reduced  through improved
management,  economies  of scale, reduced input costs, and through new technology.
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As the number of dairy farms declined so did the number of milk cows.  The size of
the U.S. dairy herd declined  from  11  million in  1982 to 9.5 million head in  1995.  The size
of the average dairy herd increased from 40 cows to 64 cows.
This structural change was not uniform for all regions.  In the Upper Midwest where
the average size dairy farm  is 55 cows and a large share  of the dairy facilities are obsolete,
dairy farm numbers declined faster than the U.S. average.  New investments and expansions
are just beginning in this area.  But dairy expansion  has been rapid in the Southwest,  West
and  Northwest.  Even  the  structural  change  to  larger  and  more  modem  facilities  in the
Northeast  has been ahead of the Upper Midwest.
Average milk per cow increased from  12,306 pounds  in  1982  to 16,451  pounds in
1995 or 34 percent.  This was an average annual increase  in productivity of 2.5 percent.  The
result of this productivity increased total milk production from  135.5 billion pounds in  1982
to  155.8 billion pounds in 1995,  a 15 percent increase.  Commercial disappearance of dairy
products  during this period increased 27 percent,  121.9 billion pounds to an estimated  154.7
billion pounds,  or  1.7 percent  annually.  The promotion  program,  and chiefly lower  real
product prices were major factors in increasing consumption.  Consequently, CCC purchases
of surplus dairy products have virtually disappeared  for the past two years.  CCC purchased
about 6 billion pounds of milk during 1994 and less than 3 billion pounds during  1995, the
lowest  level of  purchases  since  1973.  Government costs for the dairy price support program
were insignificant in (fiscal)  1995,  only about $4 million.
1996 and beyond
The future of U.S. dairy price support program is uncertain at the time of this writing.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 extended the dairy price support provisions
through  1996.  The  Act  contained  a  provision  that  the  USDA  in  estimating  the  CCC
purchases for the upcoming year must deduct from this figure any increase in the most recent
calendar  year's  dairy  product  imports  from  the average  imports  during  1986-90.  CCC
purchases  were  projected  at  less  than  3.5  billion  pounds  for  1996.  This  required  the
Secretary to increase the support price $.25  per hundredweight  on January  1,1996 to $10.35,
which will have little impact on market prices.
Debate  continues  on  a  new  Farm  Bill.  Major  regional  differences  between  the
Southeast, West and Northeast and the Upper Midwest exist.  Federal milk marketing order
provisions,  discussed  below,  have been most  contentious.  Most proposals  have been to
reduce or eliminate the support price over time.  The support on butter and NFDM could be
eliminated and allowed to seek world price levels.  There definitely appears to be a consensus
that the  support program will be eliminated over time and that the industry must consider
international  markets for dairy products more seriously.  Through the efforts of the National
Dairy Promotion and Research Board, a Dairy Export Council has been organized to assist
U.S. dairy companies.
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Regardless of the outcome dairy farmers cannot expect government support for higher
prices nor price stability.  Thus, the pressure  on dairy producers to be efficient  and reduce
production  costs will continue.  This will hasten the trend to fewer and larger dairy herds.
FEDERAL MILK MARKETING  ORDERS
As  early  as  1910,  dairy  producers  in  some  markets  had  banded  together  into
cooperative associations to gain bargaining power over prices  for their milk.  Around  1920,
cooperatives developed  a classified price system in an effort to promote stability  in milk
markets.  The Capper Volstead Act of 1922, which established the legal right for producers
to market jointly with limited exemption  from the antitrust  laws benefited this cooperative
activity.  But the success of cooperatives  in negotiating for and holding  milk handlers  to
higher pay prices met with limited success.
Dairy producers  and cooperatives turned  to legislation  for help.  The Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 required  all milk dealers in a given market to pay producers on a
classified price basis, and to pool the returns to producers either on a handler or market wide
basis.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935  set forth more specifically the terms and
provisions  that could  be used under the program  and termed  the instruments  marketing
orders.  The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 provided the framework for the
current  system  of federal milk marketing  orders.  The act was enabling  legislation  only.
Federal orders  based on the record of a detailed  public hearing, must be approved by two-
thirds of the affected producers.
It should  be noted that milk  dealers,  called "handlers"  under orders, were  also in
support of federal orders.  Milk marketing orders equalize paying prices among competing
dealers.  Federal milk marketing orders are  legal instruments  designed to promote  orderly
marketing  conditions  by  applying  a  uniform  system  of classified  pricing  and pooling.
Handlers are regulated and are required to pay at least minimum prices to producers for the
different use classes  of  milk.  Producers receive a weighted average price based upon these
minimum prices and utilization for each class.
1937-1950
Federal milk marketing orders  gained acceptance.  By  1950 there were  39 federal
orders that priced 41 percent of all grade A milk and 25 percent of all milk.  Dairy producers
experienced greater price stability and less financial risk.
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1950-1970
The  importance  of federal  orders  continued  to  increase  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.
Number  of orders  reached  80 by  1960  and priced 64 percent of all  grade A  milk and 43
percent of all milk.  Substantially  higher Class I prices (grade A milk for beverage purposes)
than manufacturing milk prices encouraged more and more grade B producers to convert to
grade A milk production and  to be  affiliated  with a handler regulated  by  an order.  This
conversion  to grade  A  was also  hastened  during  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s  by  the
adoption of the bulk tank at the farm.  Because of the price spread  between  grade A and
grade B milk (about  $1.45 per hundredweight  in 1960), when a grade B producer decided to
purchase a bulk tank, the necessary  changes were made to convert to Grade A.
In the early 1960s major adjustments were made in the federal order system.  A single
basing  point pricing system  was  established.  Eau Clare,  Wisconsin  was selected  as that
basing point.  A major purpose of federal  orders  is to assure  consumers have an adequate
supply of wholesome milk to drink,  either produced locally or transported  from a reserve
area.  Much of the Southern part of the United States experienced seasonal shortages of fluid
milk.  Wisconsin,  a major manufacturing use state, had reserves of grade A milk which could
be shipped to deficit markets.  Hence, using Eau Clare,  Wisconsin  as the basing point  for
grade A milk for Class I (beverage) use, and increasing the class I price (class I differential)
with distance from Eau Clare to move milk when needed, made sound economic  sense.2
Second,  modem  transportation  allowed  manufactured  dairy products,  butter, milk
powder and cheese to  be marketed  nationally.  Up until this time individual markets used
different methods for establishing minimum prices for milk used for manufacturing purposes.
This resulted  in different producer  paying prices  for grade A milk used for manufacturing
purposes  and  placed  manufacturers  on  unequal  footing.  To  alleviate  this problem,  the
Minnesota-Wisconsin  Price Series (M-W) was established in 1961  as the minimum price for
grade A milk under federal orders used for manufacturing, Class III use, and as the base price
and mover of other minimum class prices.  The M-W price was the weighted average price
paid for grade B milk by butter, milk powder and cheese plants in Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Thus, manufacturing  and fluid prices were linked,  and the entire  industry responded to the
same economic signs.
As  modem  transportation  and  milk packaging  technology  improved,  milk  could
economically  be  marketed  in  greater  geographical  areas.  Hence  the  market  area  of
competing milk handlers expanded.  This brought about mergers and geographic expansion
of federal orders.  By 1970, the number of orders was reduced to 62, but now 79 percent of
all  grade A milk and 59 percent of all milk was priced under  a federal order.  This merger
activity  led  to increased  incentives  to  produce  and  process  milk  in  most  economically
advantageous  locations.
2Our earlier comment indicated that economics dictated policy rather than vise versa.  This




Additional order consolidations  occurred.  By 1990, the number of federal orders were
down to 42, but 77 percent of all grade A milk and 70 percent of all milk was priced under
an order.  The share of milk that was grade A had increased from 74 percent in 1970  to 92
percent  by  1990.  With  substantially  more  milk  associated  with  federal  milk marketing
orders, the average class I utilization declined from 61.5 percent in  1970 to 42.8 percent in
1990.  While the relative difference between average producer blend prices for all orders  and
the manufacturing  price3 was 41  percent in  1960 ($4.47 vs $3.16), 28 percent  in 1970 ($5.95
vs $4.66) the difference was just 13 percent ($13.78 vs $12.21)  in 1990.  Most producers who
were going to convert to grade A had done so.
Perhaps  the most significant  federal  order action during this period was the  1985
increase  in  the class  I  differentials  in 37  of the  44  existing  federal orders.  The largest
increase  in  class  differentials  occurred  in  federal  order markets  distant  from  the  Upper
Midwest.  For example,  increases were  $.79 per hundredweight  for the  Southwest Plains
order and $1.03  for Southeast Florida compared to $.14 for the Chicago Regional order  and
$.08  for the Upper Midwest order.  These increases were mandated by the Food Security Act
of 1985, the same Act that authorized the voluntary termination program.
Because producers  in the South and  Southeast had shown the greatest participation
in the previous voluntary milk diversion program that reduced milk production and caused
shortages of grade  A milk for class I needs,  the  South and  Southeast would only  support
another voluntary  supply management program if there were some additional incentive  for
producers  to maintain milk production in their area.  The Upper Midwest  agreed to these
higher  differentials  because  the alternative  was further reduction  in the support price  for
manufacturing  milk.  Since the Upper Midwest is primarily a manufacturing milk use region
and milk surpluses held milk used  for manufacturing  close to  support, the Upper Midwest
producers would suffer from any reduction  in the support price.  But this 1985  decision was
the main  factor in major regionalism  that has  drastically weakened  the once  strong unity
among regions for federal dairy policy.
While milk surpluses  continued to be a problem in the mid to late  1980s, triggering
additional  price  support  cuts,  milk  production  expansion  was  occurring  in  the  South,
Southwest,  West  and Northwest.  The Upper Midwest put part of the blame  on the  1985
increases  in class I differentials.  The Upper Midwest claimed that the single basing point
pricing of Eau Clare,  Wisconsin  was  no longer justified  because  other sources  of reserve
grade  A milk supplies  existed  and that the Upper Midwest was no longer the lowest  cost
producer of milk.
Regional shifts in milk production did intensify during the mid-1980s to  1990.  From
1985  to  1990, the traditional  areas of milk production  lost market share:  the Lake States,
28.7  percent to  26.7  percent; the  Northeast, 20.0  percent to  18.3  percent.  The following
regions increased market share:  the Southern Plains, 3.6 percent to 4.6 percent, the Mountain
3The Minnesota-Wisconsin  Price
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region, 5.5  percent to 6.4 percent and the Pacific region,  15.5  percent to 18.3 percent (Table
4).
Table 4.  Regional  Shifts in U.S.  Milk Production
Region  Percent of U.S.  Percent of U.S.  Percent of U.S.
(1985)  (1990)  (1993)
Northeast  20.0  18.3  18.6
Lake  States  28.7  26.7  25.3
Corn Belt  11.8  11.5  10.9
Northern  Plains  3.9  3.6  3.2
Appalachian  6.1  5.6  5.3
Southeast  3.1  3.3  3.3
Delta  1.8  1.7  1.6
Southern Plains  3.6  4.6  4.7
Mountain  5.5  6.4  7.5
Pacific  15.5  18.3  19.7
Source:  USDA, ERS
1990 to present
The  Secretary  of Agriculture  held  a 43  day  public  hearing  in the  fall  of 1990  to
consider proposals  for changing class  I differentials  and related issues.  The Secretary's  final
decision  based  upon  the hearing  indicated that  there  was  not  sufficient  justification  for
changes  in class I differentials.  One result has been  a lawsuit filed by the Minnesota Milk
Producers  Association  (MMPA)  against  the  Secretary  of Agriculture  claiming  that  the
Secretary  had violated his responsibilities  under the 1937 Act by not appropriately amending
federal milk  orders.  The  case which  made its  way to  the U.S.  Appellate  Court has  been
remanded to the United States District Court of Minnesota.  The judge's decision  is yet to be
heard.
As milk now moves even greater distance with modem transportation and packaging
technology,  additional  order mergers have  occurred and more have been proposed.  There
are now 34  federal orders that price 74 percent of all  grade A milk and 70 percent of all milk.
The  majority  of grade  A  milk  not  priced  under  the  federal  system  is  priced under  the
California state order.
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Production continues to shift from the Upper Midwest and Northeast to the Southwest,
West and Northwest.  Milk production in these regions has outstripped the growth in class
I sales.  As a result, class I utilizations have declined, reducing producer blend prices.  At the
same  time,  a  decline  in  milk  production  in  the Upper  Midwest  has  resulted  in  excess
manufacturing plant capacity in the area. Competition for manufacturing milk plants for milk
supplies has intensified.  Competitive premiums and subsidized  farm to plant milk hauling
have made  average producer paying prices in Wisconsin  and Minnesota higher than U.S.
average milk prices, and higher than producer paying prices in the rapidly expanding regions.
The Upper Midwest  continues  to argue that  the single  basing point pricing  is no longer
justified and that class I prices should be levelled  among regions.  This position has carried
into the debate on the new Farm Bill, which will likely further reduce the number of orders.
Another issue has been the use of the Minnesota-Wisconsin  (M-W) pricing rule as the
reference price for national manufacturing.  Since most milk in Wisconsin and Minnesota is
now grade A (88 percent in Wisconsin and 80 percent in Minnesota),  it is argued that the M-
W no longer represents a fair market value for milk used for manufacturing purposes and that
it  should  be replaced.  The Upper Midwest  argues  that most products  in the region  are
manufactured  from grade A milk, which  is priced $0.75 to $0.90 per hundredweight higher
than grade B milk.  Since the M-W is used to set the minimum price for class III use,  grade
A  milk used for  cheese  and  butter,  this puts  Upper Midwest manufacturing  plants  in a
competitive disadvantage with other regions.  They  further claim that milk plants in other
regions can use revenue from higher class I prices under the orders to subsidize the lower
paying prices for grade A milk used for class III purposes.
A public hearing was held in June  1992 to consider proposals for replacing the M-W.
The  Secretary's  final decision  was to amend the procedure  for determining the M-W.  A
temporary  replacement  to  the  M-W  was  implemented  effective  May,  1995,  the  Basic
Formula Price (BFP), which updates paying prices based on product price changes from the
prior month.
California's pricing provisions  in its state order has resulted in a lower price than the
M-W being paid for grade A milk used to make NFDM.  This made  it difficult  for dairy
cooperatives  making  nonfat  dry  milk  to  profitably  compete  with  California  powder
producers.  Based on federal order hearings  the Secretary issued  a final decision to amend
federal orders by establishing  a class III-A price.  Skim milk used to make NFDM would no
longer be priced at the M-W (now BFP) price, but rather a value established  by a product
price formula.  This became effective in December 1993.  The result has been a lower price
for grade A milk used for NFDM than that used for cheese.  Producers in the Northwest, a
major producer of NFDM, have as a result, experienced  lower producer blend prices.  Class
III-A  pricing  has  also  resulted  using  more  powder  in  making  cheese  in  a  seemingly
inefficient intermediate  step.
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FEED GRAIN POLICIES
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 provided payments to farmers who agreed
to reduce their production of surplus feed grains.  Non-recourse  loans based on parity prices
were implemented with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.  The Agricultural Act of
1961  offered non-recourse loans and acreage diversion payments to producers who agreed
to  participate.  The Agriculture  and  Consumer  Protection  Act of  1973  substituted  target
prices and deficiency payments  for support prices based  on parity,  but the programs were
ineffective  for much of the decade  because of high grain prices.
Table 5.  Number of U.S.  Dairy Cooperatives and Their Share Of Farm Milk,  1950 to
1994
Co-op's Share of
Years  No. of Dairy Co-ops  Farm Milk
1950-51  2,072  53%
1960-61  1,609  61%
1969-70  971  73%
1974-  75  631  75%
1985 - 86  394  78%
1990-91  264  82%
1994  247  83%
Source:  USDA/Rural Economic and Community Development/Cooperative  Service
In the early  1980s high CCC loan rates drove U.S.  grain and  feed prices well above
world levels,  probably slowing down structural  adjustments  and productivity  gains in the
dairy industry.  But in the  late 1980s, the course was reversed by the  1985 Farm Bill.  Corn
loan rates, and thus market prices, were dropped  sharply, with income support provided by
direct deficiency  payments.  Annual  acreage set-aside  programs  also have tended to  raise
grain and feed prices, but these "ARP"s have seldom been applied in the  1990s,  and when
used  have  been  small.  Of course,  dairy producers  who  grow  grain  are  also  eligible  to
participate.  Attractiveness  of feed grain policies contributed  to the decline of dairying  in the
Corn Belt.
The impact of these feed  grain policies  on the dairy industry  has been to keep feed
grain prices and feed costs higher than what they would have been without support prices and
production  controls.  However,  dairy producers  having grain acreage  did participate  in the
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feed grain program.  The deficiency payment received was additional revenue that benefited
these participating dairy producers.
DAIRY  COOPERATIVES
As previously indicated producers in the early  1900s organized dairy cooperatives to
enhance their bargaining power.  In  1950 about  53 percent of producer milk was marketed
by a cooperative (Table  5).  This percentage is now about 82 percent.  About 84 percent  of
all milk marketed under federal milk marketing  orders is marketed by a cooperative.  Since
federal orders allow for bloc voting by cooperatives, cooperatives  are the key to the approval
and amendment of federal orders.
Dairy cooperatives have attempted  to add value to producer-member's  milk through
further  processing.  Currently,  cooperatives  have  the  following  market  shares  of dairy
products:  butter, 65 percent;  dry milk products,  81  percent; cheese,  43 percent;  and fluid
milk,  13  percent.  It is anticipated that these market shares are likely to increase.
The  number of dairy cooperatives totalled 2,072 in  1950, declined through mergers
to 1,609  in 1960.  Merger activity intensified in the 1960s as a means to grow geographically
and to increase market power.  By  1970 the number of dairy cooperatives  decreased  to 971.
Merger  and consolidation  activity slowed  in the  1970s  and  1980s  as  antitrust action was
imposed against the major regional dairy cooperatives.  But the need to reduce costs, be more
efficient,  and obtain more market  clout has once again initiated  mergers,  acquisitions and
consolidations  as well as various  forms of strategic  alliances with other  dairy cooperatives
and investor owned firms.  The number of dairy cooperatives  declined to 247 in 1994.
The question is, as the U.S.  dairy industry deregulates,  will dairy cooperatives play
a  greater  or  lesser  role  in  milk  pricing  and  marketing?  Will  dairy  producers  turn  to
cooperatives to provide the price enhancement and stability now provided by  federal milk
orders?  Has or will the cooperative  structure change to enable them to be effective  in this
role?  There are  differences  of opinions  in these regards.  It definitely  appears  that dairy
cooperatives  will become more active in dairy exports.
SUMMARY
The  evolution of U.S.  dairy policy and  related  government programs  has  in  some
cases retarded, but in most instances encouraged structural  shifts to fewer,  larger dairy farms
capturing available scale economies.  Dairy programs have fostered technical efficiency  and
economic  efficiency,  although  they  most  surely  have created  distortions.  At times  the
programs, both the dairy price support program and federal milk marketing orders, have been
slow to change in response to new economic conditions.  But changes,  once adopted have
generally been those that have fostered improved  performance  in the industry.
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Real declines  in the support price since  1981 have resulted in a broad sense a free
functioning  market  economy  in  the  manufacturing  dairy  sector.  Although  some  CCC
purchases have occurred, they have been mostly  butter. Market prices have been $1.00 to
$3.00 per hundredweight  above support since  1991.  The current support price represents
below break-even prices for the average U.S. dairyman.  The program costs little, $4 million
estimated for 1995.  The question  is whether  to simply let the support program wither away
or just end it.  Clearly U.S.  dairy policy will continue to be highly market oriented.  Dairy
producers  will  continue  to respond  by  striving to  adopt technologies  and management
changes that will reduce the costs per hundredweight of milk.  This action will make the U.S.
dairy industry more competitive internationally.
Federal  milk  marketing  orders  are  under  threat  of major  changes  or  if not,  the
possibility of total elimination.  The  Northeast  and  Southeast  may  be  the regions  most
negatively impacted if federal orders are eliminated.  Short run, producer prices could decline
the  greatest  in  these areas  and  accelerate  the trend  to fewer  and  larger  dairies.  Dairy
cooperatives will attempt to provide for dairy producers market protection now offered with
federal  orders.  Cooperatives  will also attempt to add value to producer-member  milk via
processing,  packaging  and  marketing.  Cooperatives  will  pursue  more  aggressively
international  markets.  These  activities  will  hasten  additional  mergers,  consolidations,
acquisitions  among cooperatives  and the formation of various  strategic alliances  with other
dairy cooperatives and  investor owned firms.
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